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The Political Economy of ‘Bachaqueo’ and the Limits to Agrarian Transformation in 
Venezuela 
 
This paper explores the contradictions and limits to agrarian transformation under twenty-first 
Century Socialism in Venezuela. Given the historical destruction wrought by the oil-based 
accumulation process upon Venezuela’s agricultural sector, the symbolic and social importance of an 
‘agrarian revolution’ could be seen as a yardstick with which to measure the progress of the Bolivarian 
Revolution in ‘sowing the oil’. Eschewing a policy focus on the role of ‘food sovereignty’ and ‘food 
security’, the paper analyses how the dynamics of rentier-capital accumulation have played out in the 
agricultural sector. The paper argues that the macroeconomic framework of the Bolivarian Revolution 
has diminished the possibility of expanded domestic food production and instead reduced agrarian 
transformation to contradictory processes of ground rent appropriation.  
 
Keywords: Venezuela, ground rent, rentier-capitalism, agrarian transformation, currency 
overvaluation 
INTRODUCTION 
The discovery of huge deposits of ‘black gold’ early in the twentieth century destroyed 
Venezuela’s agrarian past, rapidly transforming the country into an overwhelmingly urban and 
oil dependent nation. Ever since, the clarion call to ‘sow the oil’ for economic diversification 
has rung out in vain throughout Venezuela history. When Hugo Chávez assumed the 
Presidency in 1998 on the anti-neoliberal platform of the Bolivarian Revolution, Venezuela 
had the highest dependency on food imports in all of Latin America (Morales 2009). In 
response, Venezuela became one of the first countries to proclaim food sovereignty as national 
policy and developed a raft of new institutions, governance structures and policies to mobilise 
land, people and credit in a bid to transform rural development and the domestic provision of 
food. Yet the Chavez government inherited a rural labour force standing at just 3-4 per cent 
of the active labouring population; a small peasant movement; an urban population of 94 per 
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cent and an import dependent, monopoly controlled private food distribution sector (Ellner 
2008). These obstacles coalesce around the political economy of oil and the dynamics of 
rentier capital accumulation in Venezuela. The centrality of revenues from the export of oil, 
means that, unlike other Latin American countries, Venezuela has not used agricultural rents, 
or an ‘agrarian surplus’, to fund national processes of development and industrialisation.1 
Rather the most capital intensive industrial sector of the economy has historically functioned 
as a source of ‘oil’ surplus that has been tapped to finance food imports and underwrite a small 
but capital intensive agricultural and food distribution sector. The central mechanism that the 
state has used to transfer oil rents to the rest of society is an overvalued currency (Mommer 
1998). This created a huge bias against agriculture, as food imports have always been cheaper 
than national forms of production.  
By late 2015, and despite over ten years of high oil prices, Venezuelan society was 
experiencing food scarcity, triple digit inflation, historically low levels of agricultural 
production and long queues to buy price-controlled goods (Gutiérrez 2015). In fact, in place 
of local control over culturally relevant food production and consumption, a curious 
phenomenon emerged known as ‘bachaqueo’. The ‘bachaco’ is a large voracious ant native to the 
frontier zone between Venezuela and Colombia, known for its capacity to carry leaves many 
times its body weight over long distances. In 2014, the noun ‘bachaqueo’ and verb ‘bachaquear’ 
passed into the Venezuelan popular lexicon to describe the practice of re-selling government 
price controlled goods for a profit. This paper argues that ‘bachaqueo’ is the everyday expression 
of deeper contradictions within Venezuela’s agricultural and food policies which revolve 
around the overvaluation of the currency and populist price controls. This gave rise to two 
intertwined processes: a flood of food imports and widespread domestic price speculation, 
both of which have undermined land reforms, cooperative-led production, direct subsidies 
and state distribution and processing centres as the mechanisms to expand domestic levels of 
food production. Whilst not wishing to downplay the political recalcitrance of an agrarian elite 
and a private food-processing sector with a known history of corruption and hoarding – the 
so-called ‘economic war’,2 this paper seeks analytical purchase on the ways in which the 
Bolivarian state’s reproduction of rentier-capitalism has given rise to a distorted world of prices 
and values and taken Venezuela to the furthest point imaginable from national food self-
sufficiency.  
 To do so the paper mobilises the concepts of ground-rent and rentier-capitalism to 
theorize the contradictory relationship between massive oil revenues and radical agricultural 
policies, a sustained analysis of which has remained outside the purview of agrarian scholars. 
                                                          
1 If we follow the common meaning of agricultural surplus as ‘the total value of agricultural production 
minus what the agricultural sector retains for its own consumption and reproduction’ (Kay 2002, 1075), 
we can see that as a net recipient of transfers this surplus has never existed in any meaningful magnitude 
in Venezuela’s agricultural sector.  
2 See for example Rosset (2009, 17), who argues that companies were using their near monopoly power 
over food processing to undermine government price controls and pro-consumer policies.  
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At its most rudimentary, ground-rent is the tribute paid by capital out of extraordinary profits 
to the landowner, or state, for access to a non-reproducible natural resource. When, as is the 
case in an oil producing society like Venezuela, this revenue forms the nation’s primary source 
of income, rentier-capitalism can be understood as the political, social and institutional 
expressions of the appropriation and distribution of this wealth by state and non-state actors. 
This approach has the distinct advantage of not reducing the developmental effects windfall 
revenues to the ‘Dutch Disease’ (Bricen ̌o-León 2005), internal institutional pathologies of the 
petro or rentier state (Karl 1997), or resource rent populism (Weyland 2009).3 Instead, the 
paper seeks to locate the contradictions of the government’s agricultural and food policies 
within the peculiarities of a national space of accumulation based largely upon the 
appropriation rather than production of value (Coronil 1997). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section one lays out the historical development of 
domestic agricultural production and external food dependency under the influence of the oil 
economy. Section two draws upon the dynamics between food sovereignty and food security 
that has captivated much of the literature and suggests that this has led to a false juxtaposition 
of the Bolivarian Revolution’s agrarian policies, obscuring from view macroeconomic 
contradictions in the accumulation process. To address this gap section three offers a Marxist 
approach to currency overvaluation, drawing upon work that has shown how ground rent is 
transferred and valorized in natural resource centred economies (Iñigo-Carrera 2007). Section 
four locates the emergence of radical agrarian and food policies around the same time as the 
government introduced exchange rate and currency controls during a period of political 
instability. Drawing upon field research conducted in the autumn of 2015 in Caracas, and the 
regional states of Mérida and Portuguesa, section five develops an empirical narrative which 
traces out the dynamics of rentier capital accumulation in the agrarian sector. Rather than 
offering single case studies, the paper attempts to tease out the contradictions of radical 
agrarian policies through research conducted with a variety of actors in the sector.4 It is hoped 
that what this strategy loses in case study depth is compensated by the larger picture that each 
individual strand contributes to illuminate. The conclusion draws the various strands of the 
argument together to show how the concepts of ground-rent and rentier capitalism can 
illuminate the limits of agrarian transformation in Venezuela to ‘sow the oil’.  
OIL, AGRICULTURE AND EXTERNAL FOOD DEPENDENCY 
                                                          
3 With its epistemological basis in the general equilibrium models of neo-classical economics, the Dutch 
Disease offers an abstract description of the behaviour of prices under the effects of windfall revenue 
which is devoid the capacity to deal with the political economy of the accumulation process in social 
formations such as Venezuela.  
4 Around 25 interviews were conducted with state functionaries (from directors to technicians in 
various agricultural entities), small-scale producers, leaders of Fundos Zamaranos, large private 
companies and landlords, workers in the state company Agropatria, academics, activists and 
independent researchers.  
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Early in the twentieth century ‘the dance of oil concessions’ removed political pressure to 
protect the agricultural economy, landlords sold their property and used the proceeds to 
develop commercial and financial enterprises in growing urban centres. (Di John 2009, 190). 
In place of regional competition between coffee and cacao producers linked to agro-export 
Caracas based elite, a network of military and mercantilist interests set to gain from oil rents 
and an overvalued currency emerged as the main nexus between the state and world market 
(Coronil 1997, 83). By the 1950s the under-utilisation of land generated by the presence of 
latifundios, mainly dedicated to cattle ranching, had already created a chronic deficit in national 
food production, supply was outstripped by demand leading to price inflation (Rodríguez 
2011). The first concerted state-led efforts to sow the oil in the agricultural sector, and avoid 
confrontation with the landed elite, came in the 1950s with the expansion of agricultural 
frontier through the ‘US farmer’ model based upon immigrant European labour (Crist 1984: 
154). The offer of public credit and irrigated lands was taken up by a new class of medium 
scale producers using mechanised production techniques high in the consumption of industrial 
inputs (Delahaye 2001, 61). The ability to import the technological packages necessary for 
modern industrial agricultural production quickly made Venezuela one of the most capital 
intensive agricultural sectors in Latin America (Rodríguez 2011, 75).5 The main forms of 
capitalist production were in cereals, milk and meat for the expanding internal market. This 
created an apparatus of state intervention and distribution that privileged medium to large 
agrarian producers in a bid to reduce food prices for an incipient industrialisation process 
(Gutierrez 1998, 26).6  
The first agrarian reforms designed to confront the concentration and under-utilisation 
of land through re-distribution came in the 1960s. Overall, around 230,000 families benefitted 
from the redistribution of just over 12 million hectares of land (Wilpert 2005, 251). Initially, 
this saw the creation of up to 150,000 smallholders with an average of 10 hectares of land 
(Delahaye 2001). However, the granting of rural credits unconnected with extension support, 
the industrial-technological bias of agrarian production, and the poor quality of land taken 
from the agrarian frontier limited the viability of smallholders leading to the progressive 
abandonment of redistributed lands (Penn and Schuster 1965, 555 cited in Rojas 2011). This 
created an informal land market which favoured the ‘farmer’ of the rural middle class who 
consolidated their role as the primary productive agents (Llambí, 1988). This is reflected in the 
evolution of the agrarian structure. By 1971 both smallholders and latifundios had seen relative 
declines in importance, whilst medium size farms (around 2000, occupying 500,000 hectares 
with an average of 250 hectares) managed to expand in surface area and output (Delahaye 
2001, 71). For example, they went from 51 per cent of the value of vegetable production in 
                                                          
5 This created a production system that favoured a new rural middle class which required a minimum 
scale (50ha) of production to reach maximum efficiency (Rodríguez 2011). 
6 Historically, up to 20 per cent of the lending portfolio of commercial banks had to be dedicated to 
agricultural activities. Prices were controlled and adjusted according to internal production costs. 
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1961 to 55 per cent in 1971; and in the same period increased from controlling 20 to 26 per 
cent of the land under cultivation (Rodríguez 2011, 82; Delahaye 2001, 70).  
Alongside the rural middle class emerged a monopoly controlled agro-industrial sector. 
(Llambí and Cousins 1989). Dominated by large agro-industrial capitals such as Agroisleña 
and Polar, these companies benefitted from state-subsidizes and took control of the 
processing and distribution of food and agricultural inputs integrated within networks 
dependent on links with international traders (Morales 2009, 131).7 Even though the limits of 
agricultural production were beginning to reveal themselves by the 1970s (seen in falling 
productivity) (Delahaye 2001), a ten-year oil boom disguised the sector’s weaknesses as foods 
imports covered national shortfalls. The oil boom in 1973 put paid to any radical agrarian 
policies as the country could easily finance imports through a severely overvalued currency 
and Venezuela became the first country in Latin America to become a net food importer via 
a food system fully inserted into transnational circuits of distribution (Morales 2009). Private 
capital and the state bureaucracy acted in concert ensuring that the processing and distribution 
of foodstuffs did not depend on national agricultural production. In fact, the overvaluation of 
the Bolivar and import subsidies created a growing disarticulation between an expanding agro-
industrial food-processing sector and a stagnant agricultural sector (ibid, 135). This system 
continued to operate under heavy state protection until falling oil prices saw the Bolivar 
uncoupled from the dollar on ‘black Friday’ in 1983 (Delahaye 2001, 69). 
This devaluation exposed the extent to which the sector depended upon the distribution 
of oil rents through Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies. This was starkly 
revealed during the drastic fall in production levels and the availability of food following the 
introduction of neoliberal reforms by Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1989, culminating in the urban 
uprising known as the Caracazo (Parker 2008). Unable to continue food imports for domestic 
processing and subsidise domestic agriculture, the sector was exposed to a severe round of 
World Bank mandated liberalisation. During neoliberal reforms the growth of agricultural 
GDP was 0.1% between 1988-1993 and 0.3% between 1994-1997 (Montilla 1999, 7). This saw 
hunger and malnutrition grow in a context of intensified rural to urban migration, social unrest 
and an even greater dependence upon food imports (Morales 2009). Thus when Chávez swept 
to power in 1998, the food processing and distribution system was characterized by entrenched 
private monopolies, agricultural production was bereft of both capital and labour and the 
farms that remained in production were those dominated by medium to large scale capital 
intensive production (Rodríguez 2011). As is well known, Chávez assumed power on a political 
platform that was far from clear and, at the time, rural development was orientated around 
achieving greater social justice, food self-sufficiency and land re-distribution within a national 
project of economic diversification termed ‘endogenous development’ (Purcell 2013). 
                                                          
7 This system operated through the state owned La Corporación de Mercadeo Agrícola (The Agricultural 
Marketing Corporation – CMA).  
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Although the goals of food sovereignty and food security have been ever present, as the 
following literature demonstrates, their articulation and emphasis have changed over time.  
FROM FOOD SOVEREIGNTY TO FOOD SECURITY 
By 1998 small farms made up 75 per cent of the country’s landholders but they held only six 
per cent of the land, whilst the five per cent of large landholders controlled 75 per cent of the 
land (Delahaye, 2001). Setting its sights on the latifundios, the government’s 2001 Land Law 
sought to democratise underutilised rural property in favour of a peasant-led food sovereignty 
drive organised through the creation of new cooperatives. The government distributed ‘cartas 
agrarias’, or ‘agrarian letters’, which granted provisional usufruct rights and various forms of 
credit and subsidies in a bid to quickly get lands under cultivation. By 2013 the government 
had recovered 6.34 million hectares, regularised 10.2 million hectares and distributed 117,224 
‘cartas agrarias’ nationwide (PROVEA 2014, 236). Although these reforms have benefitted over 
a million people, they have not translated into a significant increase in surface area under 
cultivation. Between 2003 and 2014 the average annual surface area of cultivation was 2.1 
million hectares; this was above the 1.6 million inherited by the government in 1998 but below 
the 2.3 million reached in 1988 when land reforms were absent (Gutiérrez 2015, 40). The 
upshot has been lower than expected levels of food production despite a six-fold increase 
agricultural spending (Morales 2016). 
The literature that has evaluated the Venezuelan government’s attempt to alter rural 
development and increase levels of food production has been divided over the suitability and 
efficacy of the ‘food sovereignty’ and ‘food security’ policies rolled out by the Bolivarian state.8 
Some scholars have tended to endorse the normative and pro-peasant principles of the former 
over the productivist and technological bias of the latter (Schiavoni 2015). Looking specifically 
at peasant-state dynamics through the lens of ‘food sovereignty’, Lavelle (2013) has argued 
that campesinos have been at the radical edge of reforms, leading ‘illegal’ occupations in 
struggles with landowners and institutions over what constitutes ‘appropriate’ production in 
‘socialist’ agriculture. However, the slow pace of land redistribution, by a fragmented and often 
non-revolutionary state and violent resistance from landowners has stymied the real 
emergence of pro-peasant agriculture. Although recognising the problem of bureaucratic 
inefficiencies and intimidation by large land owners, Wilpert (2013, 11) is more sanguine about 
reforms as ‘state support and an organised peasantry ought to be sufficient’ to bring about 
greater social justice in the agrarian sector. This sympathetic account maintains that modest 
gains in production have been outstripped by demand (Wilpert 2013, 8).9 As Parker (2008, 
                                                          
8 Venezuela’s Organic Law of Agro-food Security and Sovereignty passed in 2008; however, food 
sovereignty was included in the 1999 Constitution, specifically in Articles 305, 306 and 307 (Mckay et 
al. 2014, 1181). 
9 Given that the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV) does not disaggregate agricultural GDP from the 
hotel and restaurant activity, taking them together as the ‘rest’ in national accounting figures there is a 
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139) has pointed out, production is still to recover levels reached in 1988 whilst the population 
has grown by 30% and social welfare spending has increased solvent demand from larger 
swathes of the population.  
In this context Rodríguez (2011) has argued that politically motivated food sovereignty 
initiatives (price controls and small cooperative farms) are discordant with the existing 
technological conditions of medium size farms that could increase production. This speaks to 
the ambiguity around the appropriate subject in struggles for increased food production, calls 
for which tend towards normative appraisals often without sufficient theoretical or empirical 
foundation (Llambí 2012, 128). For this reason, Kappeler (2013) has questioned the 
fundamental applicability of ‘food sovereignty’, understood a locally produced culturally 
relevant food, in a domestic context of hyper-urbanisation and import dependence. His 
ethnographic research describes as an ‘abject failure’ the state’s attempt to increase national 
production through small scale peasant led production, and that ‘state officials quickly realized 
the scale of production required to feed large urban populations were beyond the immediate 
capabilities of the existing peasantry’ (ibid, 7-8). In its place emerged a kind of ‘Fordist-
Neopopulism’ in which peasant cooperatives were arrayed around large industrial state farms 
where the economies of scale and exploitation of labour in the enterprises made calls for 
“peasant socialism” as the basis of food sovereignty appear rather strange and incongruous’ 
(ibid, 14).  
Enríquez and Newman have dealt in detail with the tensions between food sovereignty 
and food security through the lens of ‘dual power’ (Enríquez 2013) and the ‘dual-institutional 
structure’ of the state (Enríquez and Newman 2015). They point out that oil money allowed 
Venezuela to ‘cheat’ on immediate reform problems posed by potential losses in productivity 
as the ability to import food freed up space to experiment with radical food sovereignty 
reforms based upon cooperatives (ibid, 7). Yet this left untouched the underlying structure of 
large-scale private farms and when chronic food shortfalls began to emerge around 2009–10 
‘food sovereignty’ gave way to an ‘any means necessary’ policy of ramping up ‘food security’. 
This saw the fragmented state skew support towards conventional industrial farming in the 
form of Unidades de Producción Socialista (Socialist Productive Units – UPS) alongside the 
persistence of other private farms (ibid, 23). This theoretical approach draws useful attention 
to the ways in which the state, based upon the availability of oil money, has tended to 
‘intervene on behalf of both the dominant and dominated classes’ (ibid: 26). Yet, whilst 
accounting for the agents implicated in the reproduction of the same state structures, an 
inherent problem this type of Poulantzian structural-functionalism is that it elides an analysis 
of the social relations of production which the state is meant to be regulating and reproducing 
(Clark 1991). The upshot is that policy contradictions are not dealt with in relation to rentier 
capital accumulation (the nationally specific social relations of production), but depicted in 
                                                          
lack of basic knowledge of the evolution of the production in the sector. Such ambiguous statistics 
have allowed accounts to assume different ideological positions.  
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Weberian terms of the limits of ‘relative autonomy’ whereby the bureaucratic rationality of the 
state as a form of administration is compromised by political conflicts. 
Notwithstanding their internal differences, all of these accounts juxtapose food 
sovereignty and food security which neglects the fact that the Chavez government never 
produced a coherent development plan for either policy, in a way that unites macroeconomic 
design with production. This is despite policy advice from La Via Campesina recommending a 
10 per cent annual reduction in imports and an active demand shift towards locally produced 
goods by small farmers (Wilpert 2005, 263). Rather, as highlighted below, we see the politicised 
and ideological use of both concepts to justify short term and often contradictory policy 
packages. Whilst most authors do empirically note the influence of oil money and the ongoing 
dependence upon imports, this is normally ascribed to the dynamics of the ‘rentier-state’ or 
so-called ‘Dutch Disease’. An example of this can be seen in Wilpert’s (2013, 12) account 
whose analysis closes with the caveat that, ‘the problem of agricultural production is probably 
more a result of larger macroeconomic factors, such as the low prices of food imports (due to 
Venezuela’s overvalued currency), than of a failure of the government’s agricultural policies’. 
In general, the upshot is the treatment of agricultural and food policies as discrete arenas of 
analysis and struggle, in separation from the social relations of production that give rise to 
‘larger macroeconomic factors’. Through a Marxist analysis of the rentier capitalist 
accumulation process, the following develops a theoretical approach which lays the basis to 
unite the problem of the overvalued currency with agricultural and food policies.  
 
VALUE THEORY, GROUND RENT AND RENTIER-CAPITALISM 
When the capacity of a national currency to represent social wealth is greater in the domestic 
than in the world market it can be considered overvalued (Iñigo Carrera 2007). This distortion 
in a currency’s real purchasing power has two primary implications for the value of goods 
exported and imported through the overvalued exchange rate.  First, exporters are forced to 
sell foreign exchange earned in global markets below its value, the loss of a fraction of the 
export price can only be sustained because ‘a surplus profit – ground rent in the case of primary 
commodities – must be materialized in the price of the exported goods’ (Grinberg 2013, 456).10 
Therefore, for an oil rich state like Venezuela, the total value that enters into national spheres 
of accumulation in exchange for the export of oil is greater than their costs of production 
(including normal profits). Marx (1981, 799-800) termed this surplus profit a ‘false social 
value’, given that for natural resources ‘the market value is always above the total production 
price for the overall quantity produced’. Second, local access to cheap foreign exchange lowers 
the real cost of imports. This implies that imports financed by the foreign exchange entering 
                                                          
10 This implies that the costs of production for capital invested in land of differential quality – in order 
to valorise at the normal rate of profit – already accounts for the ground-rent charged by the landlord. 
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Venezuela are externally dependent on the surplus value captured from the capitals and 
working class of the importing countries (Iñigo Carrera 2007).  
On this basis ground rent can be understood as category derived from a lower level of 
abstraction than the production of surplus value by labour (the global origin of all value 
transfers), but at a higher level of abstraction than the workings of the specific institutional 
and policy environments of rentier-capitalism. Thus ground rent existing as ‘false social value’ 
is the necessary presupposition for a concrete understanding of rentier capitalism and the 
valorization of international surplus value transfers. Iñigo Carrera (2007) identifies this process 
as the accumulation of capital through the appropriation of ground rent in resource centred 
economies, a peculiar process which is always mediated by a mix of direct and indirect state 
policies which transfer the surplus to other sectors of the economy.11 The role of direct and 
indirect value transfers has also been of concern to scholars researching the relationship 
between agricultural surplus and industrial development. As Kay (2002, 1091) notes, these 
transfers can be considered ‘direct’ when they affect the price level (their domestics terms of 
trade) of agricultural commodities through mechanisms such as price controls, export and 
import taxes; whereas indirect transfers involve macroeconomic policies that result in the real 
exchange rate overvaluation (depressing their external terms of trade). Whilst these policies 
can create biases against agriculture, when the ‘surplus’ derives from mining and rather than 
agricultural production the same policies can form the basis of inter-sectoral transfers in the 
opposite direction whilst still depressing agriculture’s external terms of trade (because of 
overvaluation) (Grinberg and Starosta 2009).  
Direct price controls and the indirect sale of cheap US dollars have been the central 
mechanisms through which the Venezuelan state has distributed oil ground-rent (Mommer 
1998, 20). This can be sustained as long as the administrator of foreign exchange, the central 
bank, possesses a permanent flow of additional social wealth to offset the sale of foreign 
currency below its value (Iñigo Carrera 2007, 18-21). In Venezuela non-oil economic activity 
generates a meagre 4 per cent of the foreign exchange that enters the country, which means 
the social wealth sustaining overvaluation is oil ground rent, generated in the form of dollars 
by the state oil company PDVSA. This huge external dependence means that the 96 per cent 
of foreign exchange acquired by the state is later sold below its real value to finance imports. 
A high oil price will sustain an overvalued currency, however if the oil price declines then the 
government can either devalue the currency and generate more national money for the sale of 
oil or it can print money, expanding supply, and generate debt through tools such as oil based 
                                                          
11 Iñigo Carrera (2007, 17-21) has pioneered the analysis of direct (export and import taxes, price 
controls) and indirect state policies (currency overvaluation and subsidies) as the contradictory social 
form in which ground rent can be appropriated in resource centred economies. Strictly speaking, if the 
transfer of ground-rent does not generate expanded reproduction in the domestic market, then it would 
be more accurate to see the capture of ground rent as straightforward appropriation with no knock-on 
accumulation effects. This is relevant for the analysis below which addresses falling production, scarcity 
and the direct (fraudulent) appropriation of ground-rent.  
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bonds and external loans as a short term measure to finance spending. However, if the 
expansion of the monetary base is not ‘sterilized’ or backed up by increases in domestic 
production, the expanded inorganic basis for the continuation of selling foreign exchange 
below its value can lead to inflation. As the following section shows, these dynamics of rentier 
capital accumulation are of direct relevance to the contradictions expressed through state-led 
policies of agrarian transformation and food provision.  
RENTIER-CAPITALISM AND EXCHANGE RATE MANIPULATION  
In November 2001 Chávez convoked an ‘Enabling Law’ to push through 49 law decrees, this 
signaled the first serious confrontation with opposition groups who reacted most fiercely to 
the new Land Law. Perceived as an attack on private property and the business community, 
opposition forces led by the business chamber FEDECÁMARAS unified to reject the 
legitimacy of the Chávez government (Buxton 2005). To ward off capital flight amidst the 
business strike – following the attempted coup in 2002 – a fixed exchange rate was introduced 
in 2003 pegging the Venezuelan Bolivar (BsF) at 2.15 for the US dollar. This was accompanied 
by strict exchange controls, requiring applications to the specially created Comisión de 
Administración de Divisas (Foreign Exchange Commission – CADIVI) to access dollars along 
with the decision to increase state control over imports. To protect low-income groups, price 
controls on essential foods and fixing the currency to reduce the cost of imports was regarded 
as the best way to contain inflation. As part of the government promoted social programs 
known as misiones (Missions), food security concerns led to the creation of the subsidized food 
network MERCAL with 13,000 outlets and 4,000 feeding houses (casas de alimentación) as 
distribution points to improve food security (mainly through imports) across the country 
(Morales 2009). This established early on in the Bolivarian Revolution that the availability and 
price of food were integral to the regime’s capacity to maintain its base of support (Enríquez 
and Newman 2015).  
Renewed state control over the oil industry and the post 2004 upward trend in oil prices 
led to the rapid appreciation of the exchange rate and the overvaluation of the Bolivar – as 
state policy rather than the automatic outcome of an economic curse – took centre stage as 
the mechanism to transfer oil rent (Kornbliht 2015: 65). Pragmatic alliances formed with 
FEDECÁMARAS dissenters, the so-called ‘productive business people’ granted access to 
cheap dollars (Ellner 2015), became entrenched around these short-term macroeconomic 
measures as exchange rate, currency and price controls ossified into ‘revolutionary’ economic 
policy. Although it is not uncommon for Latin American governments to use currency 
appreciation as a way to transfer incomes to the urban working class and subsidize the capital 
requirements of ISI strategies, as will be shown below, this was biased towards consumption 
and not production thereby fomenting a contradiction between food security and food 
sovereignty policies. 
Initially the agricultural policies of the Bolivarian government sought modernization 
through private sector investment and state support of new cooperatives and Fundos 
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Zamoranos (FZ), through the redistribution of marginal lands that were already under state 
ownership.12 To lead land reforms and support newly formed cooperatives the government 
created three principal institutions: Instituto Nacional de Tierras (National Land Institute – INTI); 
Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Rural (National Institute of Rural Development – INDER) to 
provide agricultural infrastructure, such as technology and roads, credits, and training for 
farmers; and the Corporación Venezolana Agraria (Venezuelan Agricultural Corporation – CVA) 
to help cooperatives and FZ get their products to markets (Wilpert 2005, 255). By 2006, and 
despite the redistribution of 4 million hectares of land and almost USD 2 billion invested in 
rural development (not including additional credit lines made available by the National 
Assembly and off the books spending by PDVSA) (Guerrero 2014: 238), it became apparent 
that cooperatives and the vuelta al campo (repeasnatization) initiatives were not adequate to 
increase food production (cf, Page 2010). Attention turned to the creation of a deeper a 
socialist productive model and the state, using new provisions in the Land Law, intensified the 
expropriation of privately owned land and almost doubled the magnitude of rural development 
spending between 2007 and 2012 (Guerrero 2014).13 The state also created socialist production 
companies, designed to purchase agricultural products at above market rates and anchor the 
productive activities of agrarian cooperatives lacking the scale of production and market access 
needed for their own expanded reproduction (Purcell 2013). This trend towards greater state 
intervention in food production and distribution continued with expansion of credit lines, the 
recovery of more lands (totaling 6.3 million hectares by 2013) from latifundios to create large 
state farms in the form of UPS, and the expropriation of agro-industrial food processing 
companies to combat food inflation through state owned Socialist enterprises (Enríquez and 
Newman 2015). However, the overriding logic was the ideological propagation of ‘socialist 
humanism’ – prices below production costs – rather than a technical question of economic 
management and raising production levels (Ellner 2015).  
To buttress the difference between production costs and consumer prices, these 
agricultural and food policies relied on the overvaluation of the Bolivar, currency and price 
controls to channel oil rents through the state. Up until 2013, it is estimated that exchange rate 
overvaluation was never been lower than 200 per cent and reached peaks of 400 per cent 
(Kornbliht, 2015). Despite five devaluations since the creation of the CADIVI in 2003, the 
2015 US$ fixed exchange rate of BsF 6.3 now administered by the Centro Nacional de Comercio 
Exterior (The National Foreign Trade Centre – CENCOEX) was overvalued by almost 500 
per cent when measured against the parallel ‘real’ market USD exchange rate of BsF 37.75 
(ibid). As striking as these numbers are by late 2015, as inflows of foreign currency and the 
international oil price plummeted, the parallel Dólar Today market shot up from BsF. 100 in 
                                                          
12 Part of Mission Zamaro launched in 2001, Fundos Zamoranos were created by INTI to group agrarian 
cooperatives together on expropriated land. 
13 New provisions in the Land Law permitted the recovery of land deemed idle or underproductive. 
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October 2014 to BsF. 800 in October 2015.14 This created a huge distortion in the capacity of 
the Bolivar to represent social wealth. For example, at the fixed overvalued exchange rate (BsF 
6.3), 100 dollars for importers granted through a public bidding system (subasta) would be 
worth BsF 630 when selling these goods at official controlled prices in the domestic market.15 
However, the same US$100 on the parallel ‘real’ market exchange rate (BsF. 800) in late 2015 
would have a value of BsF 80,000, making the parallel market dollar 127 times more lucrative 
for importers and more expensive for consumers.16 As a result, exchange rate, currency and 
price controls have given rise to a variety of mechanisms and incentives – public and private 
– for the appropriation of ground-rent.17  
Manuel Sutherland, an independent researcher at the Centro de Investigacion y Formacion 
Obrera (Worker’s Research and Training Centre – CIFO), has argued that exchange rate 
manipulation permitting the expansion of fraudulent imports has been the central cause of 
inflation and scarcity. Two potent cases in the agricultural sector were sacks full of stones 
being registered as imports of coffee and an exponential rise in the fraudulent import of meat 
(Sutherland 2015). In the case of coffee, imports grew by an enormous 8,200 per cent whilst 
the scarcity of coffee, according to the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV), reached 94 per cent 
in 2014 as producers turned to illegal exports or abandoned production under regulated prices. 
Similarly, in the case of meat, between 2003 and 2013 imports grew by an astonishing 17,000 
per cent, whilst consumption dropped by 22 per cent (Sutherland 2015). These were either 
cases of phantom imports to access preferential dollars or, as some interviewees attested, were 
later smuggled across the border and sold in Colombia.  
The weight of import economy cannot be attributed to a so-called ‘economic war’ and 
public figures not aligned with the opposition have recognised as much. It has been estimated 
that between 1998 and 2013 agro-food imports went from US$ 1.7 billion to a high of U$ 10.4 
billion (Gutiérrez 2015, 48). Rodriguez Torres, ex Minister of Interior Justice, noted ‘many 
dollars were taken out of the country without importing anything with them, or the imported 
commodity was overvalued by the well-known fraud ‘sobrefacturación’ (overbilling) (cited in 
Sutherland 2015, 3). In the light of these examples we can see how justifying massive imports 
in the name of ‘food security’ has been one of the principal covers for the manipulation of the 
                                                          
14 Dólar Today, housed through servers in the US, is the website that provides daily prices for the ‘real’ 
value of the Bolivar to the dollar and is used as the reference price by the whole population to buy and 
dollars on the ‘black market’. 
15 On top of this there is government sanctioned 30 per cent rate of profit – an enormous legally 
sanctioned appropriation of ground-rent. 
16 In 2013 with interest rates at 15 per cent and annual inflation running at 60 per cent in Venezuela, 
trading in dollars was estimated to be 50 times more profitable than saving or investing in productive 
activities (Sutherland, 2015).  
17 In 2015, data leaked by the ‘International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’ from the global 
bank HSBC revealed that Venezuela, sandwiched between the UK and the US, had the third largest 
amount of money (US$14.8 billion) held in 1,282 offshore accounts by 1,138 clients (ICIJ 2015).  
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exchange rate for private gain (Hernández 2010). This has benefited both the domestic 
importing bourgeoisie, especially in the agro-food chains controlled by monopolistic 
producers such as Polar and the network of national supermarkets such as Makro, and those 
within the Bolivarian state apparatus, such as the military, that have controlled imports for 
food security initiatives like MERCAL and PDVAL (Morales 2016). For example, in 2010 
corruption and mismanagement was uncovered in the public food company PDVAL when 
2,334 containers of expired foodstuffs never made it into the PDVAL and MERCAL outlets 
(Clark 2010, 157).  
In the absence of a ‘redistribution of power to facilitate direct control over food systems’ 
(McKay 2014, 1179) or a devolved system of rising community-led national production, these 
macroeconomic distortions and institutionalized import fraud found concrete expression in 
the political economy of ‘bachaqueo’. Specifically, this saw state and non-state actors take 
advantage of differing prices for the same commodity through, what could be termed, rentier 
arbitrage. Within wider society the practice of ‘bachaqueo’ was initially concentrated among 
people buying in Bolivars (anything from coffee to gasoline) and selling them for Pesos over 
the border in Colombia for many times their subsidised sale price. Pesos would then be 
changed for dollars in Colombia, to be sold on the parallel market in Venezuela thus 
completing a double movement: first, a ground rent bearing good purchased domestically in 
the commodity form; and second the appropriation of ground rent through its sale and 
transformation into the money form, the latter movement forcing the real value of Bolivar – 
its domestic purchasing power – down further as demand increases for parallel market dollars. 
Rentier-capitalism can sustain the overvalued exchange rate and subsidize ‘alternative’ 
forms of production and consumption at the national level when there is a steady flow of oil 
dollars. However, with the oil price falling 75 per cent since 2014 the capacity to finance 
imports has drastically declined and there has been a growing scarcity of price controlled basic 
goods (e.g. soap, flour and milk). This has seen the practice of ‘bachaqueo’ spread throughout 
the domestic economy as people dedicate their working week waiting in lines for hours to buy 
and re-sell subsidised products. The then President of the National Assembly Diosdado 
Cabello, called the ‘bachaqueros’ a plague that are hurting the people and President Nicolas 
Maduro has passed punitive legislation penalizing the act with up to 5 years in prison. 
Nevertheless, by October 2015 the ‘bachaquero’ economy was widespread and growing. 
Opportunities arise at least one day a week when, according to the Venezuelan national identity 
card the cedula, people are permitted to buy their quota of price controlled items. As a result, 
‘bachequeando’ has assumed a systematic role in the distorted world of oil rent appropriation, 
inflation and scarcity. In fact, these practices partly explain how the popular classes have 
actually endured the pressures of creeping hyper-inflation and falling real wages, because 
everybody in some way is ‘bachaqueando’. Far from a ‘cultural’ problem of ‘rent-seeking’ or the 
product of an ‘economic curse’, this behaviour can be seen as the everyday appropriation of 
oil ground rent within the contradictions of rentier capitalism. In the agricultural context its 
institutional expression can be seen most vividly in the case of Agropatria where ‘bachaqueo’ 
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took root in an initiative ostensibly designed to lead the ‘food security’ agenda. The following 
empirical examples unfold research conducted in around the political economy of rentier-
capitalism which highlight how ‘bachaqueo’, particularly in the latest phase of Bolivarian 
agricultural and food policy, can be seen as a concrete expression of the ways in which private 
and state supported production in Mérida and Portuguesa were subsumed by the logic of 
ground rent appropriation.  
 
RENTIER CAPITALISM AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BACHAQUEO 
 
Agropatria is a state company dedicated to the purchase, production and distribution of 
agricultural inputs and falls under the wider rubric of Mission AgroVenezuela launched in 2011 
by Chávez to revamp the food security agenda. Agropatria was created through the 
expropriation of Agroisleña, a private company dating back to the 1950s that held a monopoly 
position in the supply and production of inputs for the agricultural sector. Agroisleña imported 
technological packages from transnationals such as Monsanto and, through a dedicated 
network of affiliated companies and salesmen-technicians, would distribute inputs on credit 
to small, medium and large producers across the country.  As part of the broader aim of 
undoing monopoly control over agro-industrial chains, Agroisleña was nationalized following 
accusations of price speculation and charging exorbitant interest rates to small producers 
(Orhangazi 2013, 9). In the words of the official decree to expropriate Agroisleña, the objective 
was to “graft the socialist state into the distribution chain of inputs for agrarian production” 
and confront one of the perceived causes of food price inflation (Gaceta oficial 379.889). The 
aim was to directly assign preferential dollars to a state entity, overcome intermediary 
speculation and better regulate product prices for fertilizers, agrochemicals and seeds thereby 
improving the access, and productivity, of small and medium size producers and ultimately 
increasing the national food supply without increasing food prices.  
 
In the first four years, the government claimed to have served up to 500,000 producers, 
up from the 90,000 clients of Agroisleña, and expanded its activities along three lines: the 
industrial production of fertilizers and seeds; the production of machinery; and the provision 
of transport and storage services. 18  By 2015, Agropatria had 101 outlets across the country 
and formed part of a wider push across agricultural state bodies to better unite production and 
distribution under government control. Interviews with the Fondo Para el Desarrollo Agrario 
Socialista (Fund for the Development of Socialist Agriculture – FONDAS) in Caracas identified 
the importance of Agropatria as a tool to eliminate the speculative role of private 
                                                          
18 See, http://www.entornointeligente.com/articulo/3699256/VENEZUELA-AgroPatria-atiende-a-
500000-productores-a-4-anos-de-su-nacionalizacion-07102014 
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intermediaries and to undermine monopolised distribution chains.19 For their part FONDAS 
provides its producers with a special debit card, underwritten by the Agricultural Bank of 
Venezuela (BAV), which can only be used in Agropatria outlets. This allows FONDAS to tie 
credit to the receipt of products later taking control of distribution and commercialization 
through state sponsored mercados a cielo abierto (open ceiling markets). Its producers are obliged 
to deliver 75 per cent of their crop to FONDAS which it purchases at regulated prices through 
its collection and distribution centres thus sending goods to market at controlled prices levels. 
In principle this system should ensure accountability and provide measures of productivity 
and control, as yet, however, their territorial reach is extremely limited, undermined by 
corruption and the absence of an integrated auditing or control system between FONDAS 
and Agropatria or other state bodies. Interviews conducted with Agropatria in Mérida and 
Portuguesa revealed that only around 10 per cent of their customers use BAV debit cards. 
Moreover, these producers only need small amounts of inputs for their plots, whereas large 
producers with 500 hectares and above were said to be the main beneficiaries of subsidies, as 
Agropatria does not officially discriminate between producers.  
When meetings were held in Caracas with a panel of experts from the Venezuelan 
agrarian sector, it was the doubts about the capacity to effectively manage and control 
production chains that raised concerns about expropriating Agroisleña (interview 
13/10/2015). The panel suggested that, although justified in principle, it was premature to 
expropriate a company with more than 50 years of experience and expertise. It was feared that 
the state lacked the institutional and professional capacity to manage the transition without 
unnecessarily creating shortages, logistical disruptions and opportunities for corruption. Given 
that the whole network depended upon importing, producing and processing agricultural 
products that were previously dispersed among numerous affiliated private companies, state 
take-over would imply a drastic structural reorganisation from personnel, buying, processing 
and distribution. It is in this context that during field work Agropatria was cited as ‘a pioneer 
of bachaqueo’, profiteering on the back of re-selling or manipulating access to subsidised 
agrarian inputs often en masse over the border in Colombia. Other practices included changing 
farmer’s names within the books from credit to debt, and demanding the cancellation of the 
outstanding amount before any new items could be sold. Similarly, to overcome quotas in the 
RUNOPA system, workers would use the identities of other farmers in the system to sell 
products to one large private client in bulk.20 Up to 95 per cent of agricultural imports, from 
seeds to machinery, have now been centralized through Agropatria, which according to one 
state functionary from the Ministry of Labour has created ‘chaos and corruption’ (interview 
22/10/2015).  
                                                          
19 To better fit the socialist goals of agrarian development FONDAS was created out of the old 
FONDAFA (Fondo de Desarrollo Agropecuario, Pesquero, Forestal y Afines – Fund for the Development of 
Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry, and Related Areas).  
20 RUNOPA is the government’s producer database that assigns producers with a quota of materials it 
can access through Agorpatria.  
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The historical basis of class relations in the countryside meant that small peasants were 
the worst affected by this abuse of a public monopoly, many even looking back with nostalgia 
for Agroisleña (interview 24/10/2015). Rather than extra income generated from expanded 
production, the rural poor were said to have benefitted from social missions and food 
subsidies. In fact, the weak and factional peasant movement, lacking the powers of 
mobilisation of their Latin American counterparts, was cited as the reason why producers had 
not risen up against such public corruption (interview 14/10/2016). Coupled with this are 
conjunctural factors such as the absorption of key peasant leaders into political positions 
through client relations, and, perhaps most importantly, an enduring allegiance to Chávez 
whose legacy is seen to exist above and beyond the fray of corrupt individuals. These 
characteristics have not been amenable to a mobilised and autonomous peasantry holding 
public bodies to account. In fact, food sovereignty and food security initiatives have played 
out across the very fault lines of these class relations in the countryside. The initiatives included 
under the rubric of food sovereignty, such as the expansion of social missions targeted at the 
rural poor, extension support and small producer credits have allowed peasants to ‘subsist’, 
often turning credit into consumption (Kappeler 2013); whereas the wholesaling of subsidised 
agricultural inputs have been skewed towards medium to large farmers with the scales of 
production to take advantage of food security policies. Such practices within Agropatria seem 
to have taken root immediately, only a year after its launch there were recorded losses of BsF. 
184.7 million.21 Unable to pay its employees or purchase new inventory the national executive 
injected BsF. 300 million to re-float the books.22 This example of institutionalised ‘bachaqueo’ 
is a microcosm of the appropriation of oil rent by state and non-state actors mixed in with the 
government’s inflationary expansion of the money supply to paper over the cracks of failing 
policies.  
During field work the fall in the availability of foreign exchange, due to declining oil 
prices, meant that imports of much needed agricultural inputs and machine parts had been 
dramatically reduced. Producers in Mérida and Portuguesa depend upon 7 and 5 Agropatrias 
respectively for the delivery of seeds, machinery, and high levels of consumption of agro-
chemicals and fertilizers. Unable to access the right input at the right time for their crop cycle, 
producers reported that yields had fallen as much as 50 per cent in some cases. As one farmer 
in Portuguesa commented to me, he only managed to access products because his brother 
worked in Agropatria and would call him immediately when new stock arrived (interview 
24/10/2015). But around the same time a neighbour couldn’t get the herbicide needed for his 
five hectares of frijoles (kidney beans) and lost his crop. This was compounded by a reduction 
in the rural labour force, as another farmer lost his crop because of a lack of local labour 
(interview 25/10/2015). Workers had abandoned the countryside to ‘bachaquear’, where it was 
said they could earn BsF. 5000 a day, dwarfing the official minimum salary of BsF. 7.500 per 
                                                          
21 At the official exchange rate of 2011 this equated to US$43 million. 
22 See: http://www.reportero24.com/2012/10/corrupcion-gobierno-admite-quiebra-de-agropatria/ 
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month. This has negatively influenced the production levels of important crops, like potatoes 
and rice, and contributed to the general inflationary pressures for both producers and 
consumers forced to buy goods on the black market.  
 
In fact, scarcity gave rise to an even more lucrative ‘parallel’ market.23 For example, 
Agropatria should sell its products at fair prices regulated around 30 per cent below the private 
market rate. In October 2015 the official registry marketed a 50kg sack of fertilizer at Bs. 239 
whereas on the black market, or from private outlets, the quoted price was Bs. 1500 – 468 per 
cent higher (interview 20/10/2015).24 Attributing these price differences to the politically 
motivated ‘economic war’ or dishonest individual acts of corruption somewhat obfuscates  the 
structural logic, given that this degree of price distortion is indicative of an agricultural sector 
governed by speculation and private appropriation exacerbating the sector’s inability to deliver 
food security. As one producer reflecting upon the so-called ‘economic war’ commented to 
me ‘we don’t eat politics, we eat food’ (interview 14/10/2015). Traumatic experiences of 
accessing inputs from Agropatria and selling in state distribution networks means that private 
intermediaries remained the primary agents of distribution. In particular, this cast a negative 
light on the role of open ceiling markets, the state sponsored events which sell subsidised 
goods around the country. It was suggested that in the absence of any system of stock control, 
sales receipts or oversight the national network of these markets were a hotbed of institutional 
corruption or ‘bachaqueo’ (interview 28/10/2015). Whilst much fanfare is made on government 
websites about the sale of vegetables, fruits and grains at just prices – the open ceiling markets 
have an ideological function. Rather than improving access to food and supporting agrarian 
socialism, the events can be seen as ‘performances’ in the vein of Coronil’s (1997) Magical 
State, in the sense that what underlies these events is not the demonstration of the capacity to 
produce but the political efforts to uphold the illusion of production. 
 
The Marginalisation of Socio-ecological Alternatives and Declining Production 
The Andean state of Mérida shares a land border with Colombia and is one the most 
productive zones in the country for fruits and vegetables. The area is known for the hidden 
passages to Colombia, known as Trochas, which are used to ‘bachaquear’ goods over the border 
and for the huge discrepancies between farm gate prices and consumer prices in major urban 
centres like Caracas. The state of Portuguesa is Venezuela’s most important producer of rice, 
grains and corn. These fundamental items in the food basket have historically been produced 
by capital intensive, highly mechanised farms of 200 hectares and above which control more 
                                                          
23 Rather than a ‘black market’, the category ‘parallel’ market is employed to reflect the fact that it is 
not hidden, or rather it is an open secret that the parallel market is a much closer reflection of 
production and consumption costs of daily life. 
24 It was in this context that state functionaries from Fudacite, CIARA and INIA shared the view that 
regulated prices are have become unrealistic and needed to be adjusted in the context of real costs 
faced by producers and the incentives for ‘bachaqueo’. 
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than half of Portuguesa’s agricultural land (Rodríguez 2011, 94; Enriquez and Newman 2015, 
15). Up until 2006 producers and industrial processors in Portuguesa – taking advantage of 
government subsidies – were exporting surplus rice to regional markets like Colombia 
(interview, 20/10/2015). Yet by 2015, national production was in decline and the country was 
importing rice to try and meet domestic demand.  
In Mérida, under the umbrella of the Ministry of Agriculture (MPPAT), the main 
agricultural bodies responsible for promoting the agrarian model of socialist development are 
the National Institute Agricultural Research (INIA), the Foundation for the Development of 
Science and Technology (Fundacite) and the Foundation for Training and Innovation for 
Rural Development (CIARA). In the 1970s, Mérida became the leading territory for state 
protected and subsidised potato production, with technological packages imported from 
Canada and lands turned over to homogenized intensive cultivation (Romero and Monasterio 
2005). To both reduce the dependence upon foreign seeds and foment community led agro-
ecological practices, Fundacite and INIA have been participating in a ‘food sovereignty’ 
initiative to promote the production of native potato varieties as part of the ‘Socialist Network 
of Productive Innovation’. Fundacite takes a particular interest in promoting agro-ecological 
practices, recovering local crop varieties and promoting biodiversity through ancestral 
knowledge and practices, whereas INIA’s research and development seeks to provide the 
technology and inputs for these practices. Work in the municipality of Rangel with the 23 
members of Mucuchies producer cooperative saw the certification of a new national potato 
variety, the transfer of new knowledge and techniques to community members and the 
expansion of production.  Yet the scale of production remains quite marginal and local potato 
varieties cannot compete on cost or productivity with the Canadian variety (interview, 
14/10/2015).  
The President of Fundacite complained that problems in the sector were a product of 
‘incompetence, interests and instability’ and that state bureaucrats and ‘certain’ institutions 
demonstrated ‘incomprehension and insensitivity to social change fostered from within 
communities’ (interview, 14/10/2015). In the same vein the technical manager at INIA spoke 
of a funding request for the hydroponic production of local potato varieties that in principle 
had been approved, but the financing never arrived to cover irrigation and other capital costs, 
as a result they have witnessed the gradual marginalisation of their agro-ecological initiatives. 
In this way the overall logic of external dependence on industrial scale imports from Canada 
has deepened because there are ‘too many vested interests with the MPPAT’ that have upheld 
the import economy (interview, 14/10/2015). In 2014, there were reports from across the 
country that potato seeds of low quality and in poor condition were imported from Canada 
without the correct checks and quality control carried out by Agropatria. Producers, who had 
previously been included in the delegation to monitor seed selection in the country of origin, 
denounced the mismanagement and demanded, in vain, a full investigation from the National 
Assembly. Suspicions circulated that this was a typical case of sobrefacturación (overbilling), 
whereby a receipt for foreign exchange is provided as if the seeds were of a premier class but 
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the actual import is cheaper and of inferior quality allowing vested interests to appropriate the 
difference. As a result, in 2014 national production fell by around 40 per cent and the price 
for a kilo of potatoes jumped from BsF. 28 to over BsF. 300.25  
Whilst this case was an example of the institutionalised mismanagement of foreign 
exchange, other crops have been indirectly impacted by the scarcity of inputs and the 
divergence between regulated prices and production costs. An interview at El Intento, one of 
the biggest private industrial producers and processers of rice in Portuguesa, revealed some of 
the problems they had encountered. Given that the majority of critical scholarship has focused 
upon government-sponsored sites of production, this example is useful to reflect upon the 
ways in which an individual private capital has responded to the government’s agrarian 
policies. Rice, along with other grains and cereals, is one of the areas where the state has 
complete control over prices, inputs and raw material imports. Private companies have to 
register all sales with the state, even those sanctioned at non-regulated prices, and run the risk 
of expropriation by not declaring all production and sales activities. El Intento finances the 
production and purchases rice from small to medium producers (20 to 50 hectares), later 
processing and packaging the rice for final sale to food the distribution network.  
Their ‘clients’ (producers) complained of the delays in the payment of state subsidies 
(‘which are too low’) and that the government’s regulated sales price of Bs 25 a kilo of rice 
was way below the reported Bs. 41 per kilo cost for the producer (interview, 20/10/2015). It 
was explained that this magnitude of difference is because the government estimates 
production costs based on the fixed exchange rates with which it sells dollars, imports and 
distributes the goods domestically (through Agropatria). However, production costs are closer 
to the parallel rate, because a large percentage of inputs are only available through non-
regulated channels. As a result, they have seen production deteriorate as producers dedicate 
more land to alternative non price regulated crops or simply sow sections of their land with 
any product they can get their hands on to avoid claims that can be made against idle lands. 
Unlike other agricultural products there are no price controls for fruits and vegetables, but 
subsidies for producers at the point of production. As such a phenomena encountered across 
Portuguesa (and Mérida) was the reliance upon producing non price controlled items to cross 
subsidise other loss making activities. In Portuguesa, and nationally, this has manifest in the 
fall in rice production which, according to FEDEAGRO, fell from 230,000 hectares sowed in 
2014 to 140,000 hectares in 2015. As result rice imports have increased, but in a manner that 
further undermines national production because cheaper imports actually flooded the market 
at the same time as the national harvest (interview, 20/10/2015).  
To manage their own cost structure and evade the system of price controls, producers 
like El Intento add flavours and extra ingredients to their rice so they can market it as a special 
product outside of the price controls that dictate the sale of basic rice. According to their 
                                                          
25 See, http://www.aporrea.org/medios/n273684.html) 
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production manager they divide this between 60 per cent for the price-controlled markets and 
40 per cent (with added flavours) for the private market (interview, 20/10/2015). Whether or 
not this was a true reflection of how they divide their product, they claimed it was the revenue 
generated from the sales of the latter that cross-subsidised losses made in the sale of rice at 
state regulated prices. Yet this private capital did inadvertently reveal the private sector’s 
reluctance to invest and expand operations. Legally banks must lend 20 per cent of their 
portfolio to the agricultural sector, but to whom they lend is at the discretion of individual 
banks who tend to seek out large traditional clients. As a ‘respected’ and ‘efficient’ producer 
El Intento has been able to take large loans for ‘capital that is almost free’ given the rampant 
level of inflation and negative real interest rates.26 However, this capital was taken not to 
support production but to save until the ‘political climate’ becomes more propitious for 
investment (interview, 20/10/2015). In this case, therefore, it was less about the direct 
hoarding of foodstuffs but internal transfer pricing and the hoarding of cheap capital. From 
the point of view of increasing food security, what we see in this example is that in spite of 
the expansionary credit environment capital is not investing in production let alone improving 
methods of production. In both Mérida and Portuguesa one of the processes that came to the 
fore was the fragmented and divided scale at which government initiatives have tended to 
operate, largely leaving untouched the structural power of capital and private intermediaries in 
the agrarian sector. Whilst government food sovereignty initiatives have had short life-spans, 
food security policies have created agro-industrial white elephants and both have been unable 
to create alternative production and trade networks (economies of scale). 27 At the same time 
large agrarian capital has adopted a defensive consolidation strategy, the common ground 
between the two processes has been the inability of the state, government supported small 
producers and the private sector to expand the scale of agrarian production.  
 
CONCLUSION 
David Harvey (2014, 6) notes that we only tend to ask the bigger questions ‘when something 
dramatic happens – the supermarket shelves are bare, the prices in the supermarket go haywire, 
the money in your pocket suddenly becomes worthless’. Taking the phenomena of ‘bachaqueo’ 
as a concrete expression of rentier capital accumulation, this paper has attempted to ask after 
the ‘bigger questions’ surrounding what is perhaps the terminal phase in Venezuela’s 
Bolivarian model of agrarian transformation. It was shown how short-term measures adopted 
                                                          
26 As of 2015 the nominal interest rate was 15 per cent, but with an official rate of inflation of 180 per 
cent the real rate is a negative 165 per cent, in other words its free money (Sutherland 2016). 
27 During an interview in Merida with the President of the Fundo Zamorano Jesus Antonio Guerrero, 
we accidentally came across a Yuca processing plant lying idle that was replete with shiny untouched 
machinery imported from Brazil. The peasant leader explained the type of Yuca needed for the 
machinery is not grown locally and that the plant was at best a vanity project of local politicians not 
connected to any real production plan – the plant was never officially opened – and at worst an act of 
blatant corruption (interview 14/10/2015). 
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to control capital flight and protect urban consumers (price controls and the fixing of the 
exchange rate) served to undermine policies geared towards increasing production (access to 
cheap credit, technical support and subsidised inputs). Instead, control over the exchange rate 
and access to foreign exchange turned into sources of corruption and chaotic populist 
spending. The way in which ground rent financed the ramping up food imports and spending 
in the countryside, has undermined the prospects for the expanded reproduction of domestic 
food production under an alternative system of social production relations. Whilst the 
intentions of land reforms and the launch of cooperatives and FZ under the banner of food 
sovereignty was a progressive political response to an inherited social debt and extreme 
marginalisation of the rural poor, small producers benefitted most from direct populist 
spending rather than expanded income and political power through control over food 
production, processing and distribution. 
The paper approached rentier-capitalism as the political, social and institutional 
manifestations (phenomenal forms) of global value relations underpinned by the circulation 
and valorisation of ground rent. This theoretical perspective allowed the paper to question the 
juxtaposition of food sovereignty and food security and instead focus on these policies as 
concrete political forms taken by contradictions in the accumulation process which have 
played out across the faultiness of class relations in the countryside. By moving beyond single 
policy or case studies and drawing out the internal relations between the oil economy and the 
agricultural sector, the paper unpacked how price distortion, input scarcity and falling 
production was indicative of an agricultural sector and system of food imports subsumed by 
the logic of speculation and private appropriation of public assets and goods. From this 
perspective, the paper critically reflected on the direct (price controls and subsidies) and 
indirect (currency overvaluation) policies which opened an overwhelming gulf between prices 
and values creating multiple opportunities for the practice of ‘bachaqueo’ in the agricultural 
sector. This is not to downplay the political dimension of a recalcitrant agrarian elite, nor to 
reduce the complexity of instituting new agricultural policies to macroeconomic policy, but 
rather to shine a light on the political economy of rentier capital accumulation that has until 
now remained outside the purview of agrarian scholars.  
The evidence tied together examples of how rentier-capitalism impacted agrarian 
transformation. The state company Agropatria, the entity responsible for the national 
distribution of agricultural inputs and ostensibly geared towards enhancing the food security 
agenda, was identified as an institutional expression of ‘bachaqueo’ manipulating the access to 
key inputs outside regulated prices for private gain. In particular, this took advantage of a weak 
divided peasantry and undermined the interests of those small producers which the company 
is meant to represent. The agro-ecological production of potatoes in Mérida was shown to 
have a marginal presence in the context of ongoing incentives and interests to keep alive the 
industrial scale imports of Canadian seed imports. The fall in the oil price and the availability 
of foreign exchange also reduced the availability of key inputs through official channels, 
forcing producers into the parallel market and raising production costs. This has manifest in 
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the deterioration of rice production in Portuguesa and reinforced the defensive strategy of 
large private producers to hoard cheap capital and reduce output of price controlled goods. 
This was expressed in the ongoing fragmentation, de-capitalization and the generalised 
inability to expand production. 
By 2016 the government’s response to severe food shortages was the promotion of 
urban-farms and micro agro-ecology as the route towards ‘socialist’ food sovereignty. This 
strategy was rolled out at the same time as the government moved to further restrict imports, 
dismissed any significant devaluation of the currency or measures to reassess the viability of 
costly price controls (Álvarez 2015). Agrarian transformation seems trapped within a kind of 
inflationary inertia, Maduro’s government holds steadfast to the line that inflation, shortages 
and growing hunger are the product of a so-called ‘economic war’. This stance of an ostensibly 
revolutionary government working in the interests of the peasantry and working class is 
farcical at best and self-destructive at worst.   
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